The study of multi-agent strategic interactions both in economics and engineering mainly relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. This raises the question whether Nash equilibrium makes approximately accurate prediction of the user behavior. One justification for Nash equilibrium is that it arises as the long run outcome of dynamical processes, in which less than fully rational players search for optimality over time. However, unless the game belongs to special (but restrictive) classes of games, such dynamics do not converge to a Nash equilibrium, and there is no systematic analysis of their limiting behavior [1]- [3] .
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Potential games is a class of games for which many of the simple user dynamics, such as best response dynamics and fictitious play, converge to a Nash equilibrium [2] , [4] [5] [6] [7] . The objective of this paper is to examine whether the convergence properties of dynamics in potential games can be extended to games that are "close" to potential games, thereby enhancing the predictability of user interactions. Intuitively, dynamics in potential games and dynamics in games that are close (in terms of the payoffs of the players) to potential games should be related. In this paper, we make this intuition precise by establishing convergence of dynamics to "approximate" equilibrium sets in near-potential games.
Convergence of update rules in potential games is usually proved by using the potential function of the game to construct a Lyapunov function for the dynamics. Our approach for studying the dynamic properties of arbitrary games relies on (i) finding a close potential game to a given game, (ii) constructing a Lyapunov function for this potential game, and (iii) establishing convergence of the dynamics to an approximate equilibrium set in the original game, using the Lyapunov function of the close potential game. Intuitively, the close potential game can be thought of as a system which we know how to analyze, and the difference between this game and the original game is a perturbation of this system. Using the Lyapunov function for the potential component, and perturbed system analysis techniques, we establish the dynamic properties of the original game.
Our results are stated by employing the notion of maximal pairwise difference. For given games G andĜ, the maximal pairwise difference (denoted by d(G,Ĝ)) is a measure of how different preferences of players in these games are (see [8] for a formal definition of pairwise difference).
Since in arbitrary games, dynamics generally do not converge to a Nash equilibrium, we focus on the convergence to a set of approximate equilibria or -equilibria. Exploiting the properties of the potential function of a close potential game, we establish that the natural discrete and continuous time dynamics converge in the original game to the set of -equilibria, where is proportional to the maximal pairwise difference between the games. For instance, consider the following update rule:
Definition 0.1 ( -Better-Response Dynamics): At each time step t, a single player is chosen at random for updating its strategy, using a probability distribution with full support over the set of players. Let m be the player chosen at some time t, and let p ∈ E denote the strategy profile at t. If u m (p) < max q u m (q, p −m ) − then player m updates its strategy to a strategy
where the new strategy is chosen uniformly at random from this set; otherwise player m does not modify its strategy. For the dynamics defined above, using a potential game approximation, we establish the following convergence result:
Theorem 1: Let G be a game, and letĜ be its closest potential game. Assume that ≥ d(G,Ĝ). In G, the trajectory of the -better-response dynamics is confined in theequilibrium set after finite time, with probability 1. Similar results can be obtained for best response dynamics, logit response dynamics, and continuous time fictitious play dynamics, see [9] . Informally, our results point to the following property of dynamics in games: "the closer a game is to a potential game, the closer the dynamics approach to a Nash equilibrium".
